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Abstract
An indirect utility model is employ for measuring farmers willingness to voluntarily accept
yield losses for a reduction in environmental risk by decreasing pesticide use.  Results
support the hypothesis that farmers have self-described risk perceptions that enable them
to make assessments of risk-yield tradeoffs.  Policies designed to encourage and assist
farmers making voluntary pesticide reductions can result in environmental risk reduction. 
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TRADEOFFS IN CROP PROTECTION DECISIONS
Crop protection alternatives in the 21st century are evolving in response to public
demand for dual goals of crop and environmental protection.  Passage of the Food Quality
Protection Act in 1996 could mean new restrictions on pesticide use, with tolerances
tightened to meet the negligible health risk standards required by the law (Jaenicke, 1997). 
At the same time, alternative treatments such as bioengineered pest resistance are being
challenged on safety grounds (Greenpeace International, 1997).  Management changes
hold promise for reducing environmental risk, but lack of management expertise and
concern over yield reductions are barriers to widespread adoption (Jaenicke, 1997). 
Emerging research will focus on systems that combine chemical, biological and
management strategies for protection of crops and human and environmental health
(Council for Agricultural Science and Technology [CAST], 1995).  More choices will be
available, testing farmers’ capacity to assess environmental and economic risk tradeoffs in
order to select appropriate systems.  We quantify these risk tradeoffs under current crop
protection options for Midwest farmers and relate the results to new strategies for
environmental protection.
Policy makers in the past have used command and control regulation, taxes, legal
solutions and tradeable permits to solve pollution problems.  Now increasing emphasis is
placed on voluntary compliance with environmental objectives.  The newly instituted
Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program supports voluntary commitments to
pesticide risk reduction through financial and technical support (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1996).  Other programs help farmers evaluate the environmental risk2
associated with their enterprises and develop means of reducing them.  The Farm*A*Syst
program documented participation by 30,000 farmers in 29 states, with average voluntary
investment of $800 per farm to reduce or eliminate water quality risks through self-
identified resource management changes (Farm*A*Syst National Office, 1996).  The
Great Lakes Basin Comprehensive Farm Planning program, the Idaho One Plan, the
Pennsylvania One Plan, and the New York City Watershed Agriculture Program are farm
planning support programs.  Farmers use environmental auditing techniques to identify
risk and develop action plans that comply simultaneously with all relevant environmental
regulations (Vickery and Lohr, 1997). 
Arora and Cason (1996) noted that little economic research on voluntary
compliance was done prior to development and initial implementation of such approaches. 
In agriculture, voluntary adoption of alternative chemicals and chemical practices
commonly has been explained by modeling observable characteristics of the farmer, the
farm, the technology, information sources and institutional arrangements. D'Souza,
Cyphers, and Phipps (1993) present a review of this literature.  Weaver’s (1996) utility
analysis of farmer adoption of sustainable practices included perceptions about
environmental protection, economic capacity for reduced chemical use and training
requirements as explanatory factors.  His results indicate that farmer beliefs and
perceptions, which must be self-identified by farmers rather than observed,  modify the
economic decision.  We extend this research by explicitly considering risk tradeoffs, which
underlie voluntary compliance decisions.   3
Weaver (1996) did not distinguish between purely voluntary and incentive-based
voluntary participation, such as the case of cost-sharing for soil conservation programs. 
Arora and Cason (1996) demonstrated firms’ participation in a purely voluntary toxic
chemical reduction program is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior.  Firm size and
toxic release rates were positively related to participation, which was motivated in part by
cost savings of substituting nontoxic chemicals and by concern over consumer perceptions
of the firm’s environmental record.  We extend this model to crop protection decisions
and test whether farm size and chemical expenditures affect willingness to trade off
economic and environmental risk.  Rather than compare adoption of specific technologies,
as most studies have attempted (Owens, Swinton and van Ravenswaay, 1997), we focus
on the risk tradeoff itself which derives from the farmer’s utility function and thus modifies
the adoption decision invariantly regardless of the technology choice.
By identifying and quantifying risk perceptions that modify the economic crop
protection decision, we can suggest design elements for voluntary environmental
protection programs that will increase their probability of success.  How strongly farmers
value environmental and economic factors will affect the range of crop protection choices
they are willing to consider implementing and the degree of environmental protection that
can be expected to result from their decisions.
In this study, we quantify the willingness of farmers to trade yield losses for
environmental gains.  The value of an acceptable yield loss is indicative of belief that
measurable risk reduction results from decreased chemical use.  We use a utility difference4
model to value voluntary pesticide reductions by crop farmers in four Midwestern states in
the U.S.  Our empirical model describes farmers’ decisions to  reduce insecticide and
herbicide applications in return for environmental benefits. 
Valuing Risk Tradeoffs
Farmers’ attitudes about chemical risk and perceived advantages of reducing
pesticide use have been mainly ignored in research.  The exclusion of lay opinion about
risk due to chemical reduction is common, yet research that relies on expert opinion and
observed data for risk usually exaggerates losses and ignores important sources of
knowledge that could influence these estimates (Jaenicke, 1997; Higley and Wintersteen,
1996).  Much research fails to account for the environment-related and production-related
benefits from pesticide reduction (Jaenicke, 1997).  Examples of the former include effects
on wildlife, endangered species and native plants.  Examples of the latter include impacts
on beneficial insects, livestock and crops and operator health. 
Pesticide reduction has two risk consequences for farmers, potential gains in
environmental quality and possible yield loss, resulting in monetary loss to the operation. 
Use decisions trade off these risks.  The true risk levels and their relationships to
insecticide use are not known with certainty by the farmer.  However, each farmer forms
subjective estimates of the probabilities and values of decision outcomes and these
expectations are known with certainty to him or her.  Of interest is how this information
may be elicited.   5
Viscusi and Evans (1990) highlighted the limitations of market data in estimating
individual preferences for risk reduction.  For example, hedonic wage studies estimate the
average tradeoff of risk and increased wages but provide no information on the impact of
individual utility functions.  Figure 1 illustrates the source of this limitation using the
scenario of the farm producer.
Let ABC represent the frontier of available farm enterprise returns - environmental
risk combinations facing the producer.  The producer selects the optimal production point
B from this frontier, where the locus of EU is tangent to the enterprise returns frontier. 
Market data and observed prices can provide evidence on the slope of the tangency with
the frontier ABC.  Information about the shape of the producer's utility function is
available only for the rate of tradeoff at the tangency with the returns frontier.  Viscusi and
Evans (1990) noted that a strength of quasimarket data obtained by survey is that it tracks
a change in the farmer’s risk condition, permitting estimation of individual utility
functions.
The tradeoff between environmental benefits and yield loss is valued through the
farmer's maximized utility function.  The attitudes a farmer expresses reveal this
underlying utility function and the expectations about risks of costs and benefits from
reducing pesticide applications.  The utility function determines the choice among crop
protection options.  Modeling this function avoids the discrepancy between market
choices and utility functions noted by Viscusi and Evans (1990). 6
Cost of reducing chemical use is acceptable yield loss, measured as expected
revenue loss. This value is the upper limit on willingness to pay for gains from pesticide
reduction, since any lesser yield loss down to zero would also be acceptable if the same
benefits were gained.  Benefit to the farmer is protection of the environment, measured as
the subjective rating of importance in protecting amenities from pesticide impacts. 
In quasimarket studies, individuals have had difficulty assessing values for
environmental goods that are not directly consumed as commodities or production inputs,
due to lack of experience with the goods and disassociation of actions with environmental
consequences (Diamond and Hausman, 1993).  Unrealistic attitudes about the affordability
and method of payment for the perceived benefits of an environmental good also hinder
valuation efforts (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  An individual who recognizes the
importance of an environmental good may offer a payment for the good that exceeds his
or her budget constraint.
Survey evidence suggests that farmers may be better prepared than the general
public to evaluate the risk tradeoff as they have more information about both benefits and
costs of reducing pesticide use.  Rockwell et al. (1991) confirmed that farmers are aware
of their budget constraints and have experiential and science-based information on the
yield risk from cutting back pesticide use. Also, farmers have demonstrated greater
awareness of environmental impacts of management decisions, particularly for ground and
surface water (Rockwell et al., 1991).  Farmers are aware of the distinction between
production-related and environment-related benefits of pesticide reduction and may beV p ￿ F(Y , A , Z , S | e p).




expected to value them accordingly (Jaenicke, 1997).  Quasimarket valuation provides an
appropriate way to measure farmers' risk tradeoffs.
Decision Framework
Begin with the producer's indirect utility function defined over environmental
goods, G, and the choices of management practices including pesticide applications
conditional on environmental risks.  Let V  be the state-dependent utility function when p
the producer maintains current applications with the current level of environmental risk at
e .  The indirect utility function depends on the producer's income level (Y), vectors of the p
individual's environmental attitudes (A), the individual's demographic and farm
characteristics (Z) and regulatory and environmental conditions in the grower’s state (S) 
Let V  be the state-dependent utility function when the producer chooses a voluntary np
reduction in pesticide applications associated with reduced risk of environmental impacts
to risk level e .  The compensated willingness to pay for the environmental good is np
derived from the utility difference model 
The acceptable yield loss (L*) is the dollar amount that equates the conditional ex
ante indirect utility functions for the two choices where ￿V is the indirect utilityL ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿1A ￿ ￿2Z ￿ ￿3S ￿ ￿￿ .
d￿V ￿ ￿VLdL











difference.  The empirical model for the acceptable yield loss for each producer depends
systematically on the variables defined above: 
Random and unobserved factors that influence yield loss appear in the error term denoted
as ￿ .  We specify marginal utility of income as constant across states of environmental
*
quality and independent of income.  McConnell (1990) noted that income is typically
inferred from ranges and subject to differing levels of state and local taxes and its inclusion
creates the potential for measurement error.  Monetary yield losses associated with
reduced pesticides were not expected to significantly alter utility of income derived from
farm operations.  Econometric tests also confirmed that the marginal utility of income was
constant, so income was excluded from the monetary yield loss model in equation 3.
Holding indirect utility constant while environmental risk varies defines the yield
loss L* implicitly as a function of risk denoted as L*(e), where risk change is e = e  - e p  np
(Harrington and Portney, 1987).  The total derivative of ￿V with respect to e is set equal
to zero along the indifference curve so that 
This term is the marginal willingness to pay for a decrease in environmental risk. 
Harrington and Portney (1987) emphasized that the marginal willingness to pay depends9
on the producer’s indirect utility function.  We model this function using environmental
attitudes, farm characteristics and state level regulatory and environmental conditions.
We implemented the model for valuing subjective risk tradeoffs by farmers using a
quasimarket interview approach applied and validated by Viscusi and Evans (1990). 
Higley and Wintersteen (1996) confirmed that producers have experience in valuing
environmental costs associated with insecticide and herbicide decisions in pest control. 
Farmers were asked to numerically rate the importance they place on avoiding risk for
eleven environmental goods that could be affected by insecticide and herbicide use.  Then
they evaluated their acceptable yield loss for using one less application of insecticides
contingent on the reduction eliminating a moderate risk to the rated amenities.  A
herbicide reduction response was generated following the same procedures.  The
definition of "moderate risk" was based on persistence and toxicity ratings for impacts on
water quality and organisms (Higley and Wintersteen, 1992).  The elimination of the
moderate risk by this action was presented as a certain probability.
The empirical structure in equation 3 is linked directly to the questionnaire
presented to farmers, in which they were asked to value their acceptable yield loss.  In this
form, we can use the survey data to econometrically estimate the parameters that describe
this relationship and test their statistical significance.  We propose a system of equations to
account for the possible linkage of the insecticide and herbicide decisions through the
underlying utility function.  Equation 3 indicates through ￿  that acceptable yield loss 1
increases with intensity of environmental attitudes.  The more strongly farmers feel about10
environmental protection, the greater their willingness to pay for environmental protection
through yield losses.
Sample Description
To estimate the model, we used data from 1,124 questionnaires returned in a
survey by Higley and Wintersteen (1992, 1996) of field crop producers in Illinois, Iowa,
Nebraska and Ohio.  Corn and soybeans are the main crops grown in these states.  The
initial mailing was in early July 1990, and a reminder and duplicate survey form were
mailed to each nonrespondent in early August 1990.  Details of the survey administration
are available in Higley and Wintersteen (1992, 1996).
Individual characteristics in the decision model include acres farmed, years in
farming, and years of formal education.  Respondents separately rated the importance of
avoiding insecticide and herbicide risks for 11 environmental goods using a 10-point
Likert scale, with 1 corresponding to "Not Important" and 10 corresponding to "Very
Important."  This scale has been validated in studies of risk perceptions held by consumers
(Eom, 1994) and by producers (Weaver, 1996) and offers a simple and easily interpretable
measure of risk attitudes.  The mean cumulative ratings were 92.9 for insecticide risk and
92.1 for herbicide risk in Illinois, 92.8 and 90.8 in Iowa, 93.1 and 91.4 in Nebraska and
88.4 and 87.4 in Ohio, of possible ratings of 110.
Since individual responses may be influenced by environmental conditions and
regulations that vary by state, we supplemented the survey data with two indexes
constructed from the 1991-1992 Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1992). The Green Index11
ranks states on the basis of 256 indicators of pollution, quality of life, renewable and
nonrenewable resource management, human health, environmental policies, and state
Congressional voting. We summed the rankings for 256 indicators to obtain an
environmental score variable for each state.  The lower the value, the better the state
ranks.  The environmental scores were 7052 for Illinois, 6541 for Iowa, 7001 for
Nebraska, and 7411 for Ohio.  These compare with a minimum score of 4583 and a
maximum score of 8658 for all fifty states. 
The index of agricultural pollution is a subset of these indicators, with rankings for
14 indicators of agricultural impacts on soil and water quality, agrichemical use,
participation in conservation programs and importance of agriculture to state economy.
The agricultural pollution scores were 405 for Illinois, 414 for Iowa, 422 for Nebraska
and 342 for Ohio. For all fifty states, the minimum score was 193 and the maximum was
455.  Both indexes enter the model in logarithmic form.
The farmers quantified acceptable yield losses per acre to reduce insecticide use by
one application on all acreage and avoid moderate risk for the 11 environmental amenities. 
A second scenario elicited acceptable yield losses associated with one less herbicide
application.  Respondents were provided information about the average costs for single
treatments of insecticides ($7 to $15 per acre) and herbicides ($5 to $25 per acre) before
being asked their willingness to pay.  They were also asked how much they spent on
insecticides and herbicides in 1989, including application costs.  Reported expenditures
averaged $3.46 per acre for insecticides and $12.80 for herbicides.  The average12
insecticide cost fell outside the suggested range. While herbicides are typically used each
year for corn and soybeans, the major crops grown in the region, insecticide use in any
given year may vary depending on the effectiveness of crop rotations and IPM strategies.
The mean acceptable yield losses were $8.25 per acre for avoiding moderate
insecticide risk to environmental amenities and $10.52 per acre for herbicide risk
reduction.  By state, average acceptable losses for avoiding insecticide risk were $7.98 in
Illinois, $8.52 in Iowa, $8.35 in Nebraska and $7.84 in Ohio. The largest value answered
was $40 per acre and the smallest was $0.  For avoiding herbicide risk, farmers averaged
acceptable losses of $10.46 in Illinois, $10.92 in Iowa, $9.90 in Nebraska and $10.09 in
Ohio.  The range of acceptable losses from reducing herbicide application was $0.00 to
$50.00 per acre.
The summary results confirmed two critical perceptions.  First, virtually all
producers recognize the importance of environmental risks from both insecticides and
herbicides.  But some producers do not accept the premise that they should pay to help
avoid environmental risks.  The acceptable yield loss was zero for 14 percent of the
sample for insecticide risk avoidance and 10 percent for herbicides, indicating an
unwillingness to pay any environmental costs.  Higley and Wintersteen (1992, 1996)
concluded from sample statistics that bias in these values due to a disproportionate
number of environmentally concerned producers was unlikely.
Results 13
 The definitions of variables used in the model are presented in Table 2.  The
dependent variables in the multivariate model are acceptable yield losses for reduced
insecticide risk (INSYLOSS) and reduced herbicide risk (HRBYLOSS).  The vector Z in
equation 3 is composed of ACRES, FARMYR, and EDUC.  Linear and quadratric
measures of total per acre expenditures on insecticides, ITOTCOST, ITOTCOST2 and
herbicides, HTOTCOST, HTOTCOST2 were also included.  
The vector A contains two dimensions of the producer's environmental attitudes. 
For the insecticide reduction scenario the variable INSECN represents an index for six
environmental goods that affect yield risk through impacts on farm and human
productivity.  These goods are surface water, ground water, beneficial insects, harm to
livestock/crops, acute toxicity to the farmer and others, and chronic toxicity to the farm
family.  INSENV is an index for five goods that affect risk to life support and quality of
life environmental functions.  These goods are fish, birds, mammals, native plants, and
endangered species.  Both indexes are sums of the importance ratings, so that a
respondent who rated all factors as very important (10) would have a value of 60 for
INSECN and a value of 50 for INSENV.  Similar ratings were elicited for the herbicide
reductions and are defined as HRBECN and HRBENV. 
The vector S in equation 3 contains the variables ENVSCOR and AGPLSCOR.
These indexes reflect the environmental conditions and agricultural pollution levels in each
state. Each producer from a given state has the same values for the two variables, so that14
any significant variation due to state conditions is detectable.  These scores were discussed
in the previous section.  
 Maximum likelihood estimates for the seemingly unrelated system of yield loss
equations are presented in Table 3.  We tested the hypothesis of constant marginal utility
of income across states of environmental quality variables.  The likelihood ratio test for
the restricted and unrestricted models yielded a calculated 3  value of 1.912, which did 2
2
not exceed the critical value of 5.99 at the 95 percent confidence level.  The income
coefficients were not significantly different from zero and were omitted from the model.
The estimated coefficients on ITOTCOST and HTOTCOST were significant and
positive, while those on the quadratic terms ITOTCOST2 and HTOTCOST2 were
negative.  Farmers who spend more for pesticides are willing to accept higher yield losses
to avoid moderate environmental risks.  Acceptable yield losses for the sample peaked
with insecticide expenditures of $45 per acre and herbicide expenditures of $97 per acre. 
Every additional dollar spent on chemical crop protection increases the level of acceptable
yield loss, by $0.073 per acre for insecticides and by $0.094 per acre for herbicides. 
Since there is little variation in crop mix in the four states, there is little chance that
large per unit price differences in chemicals are responsible for this result. Farmers who
spend more may have better yields and so may be able to tolerate larger yield losses in
return for environmental protection.  Farm size in acreage has no effect on risk tradeoffs,
suggesting voluntary chemical reduction is not scale-dependent.15
Estimated coefficients on FARMYR and EDUC were positive and significant for
the insecticide equation, but only FARMYR was significant for the herbicide tradeoff. 
More experienced, better educated farmers accept greater yield losses to avoid
environmental risks from insecticides.  For herbicides, fewer alternatives have been proven
effective so that education may have little effect on ability to substitute nonchemical
methods.  These farmers risk greater losses in human capital from health effects of
environmental damage than less experienced, less educated farmers.  More experience and
education imply necessary skills and knowledge to adjust crop protection practices while
reducing applications, and greater awareness of the effects on environmental goods.
INSECN was not a significant factor influencing willingness to pay for
environmental protection through insecticide reduction, but HRBECN has a significant
positive effect on the herbicide risk tradeoff.  The mean sample value for INSECN was
53.2 and for HRBECN was 52.5, close to the maximum rating of 60.  Avoiding risk to
environmental goods that have productivity impacts is very important to farmers, but this
concern does not alter acceptable yield losses for insecticide risk.  Extensive water quality
testing in the Midwest revealed that herbicides are a major contaminant, while insecticide
pollution has not been significant.  The positive effect on acceptable yield loss of a high
importance rating of the HRBECN factors coupled with awareness of contamination by
herbicides suggests credible risks to human and livestock health stimulate voluntary
reduction in chemical use.16
INSENV and HRBENV have significant positive influences on acceptable yield
losses.  The mean value for INSENV was 39.0 and for HRBENV was 38.2, compared
with a maximum of 50, suggesting less agreement on the importance of these life support
factors than for the economic factors.  Farmers who express strong support for protecting
environmental goods are willing to pay more to avoid damage, even if there is no direct
benefit to net returns for the farm.  
A useful method to express the risk-yield loss tradeoff is in terms of the dollar
value of the acceptable yield loss required per unit of risk.  We calculate this value for
marginal changes in the economic and environmental risk indexes based on equation 4. 
The implicit value of environmental and economic risks at current levels of herbicide
applications is $0.14 per acre and is approximately evenly divided between environmental
and economic risks.  For insecticide applications the marginal willingness to pay for risk
reduction is $0.10 per acre.  The environmental risk component accounts for about 88
percent of this value.  
A policy maker might reasonably expect that assistance programs targeting
voluntary environmental risk reduction would best succeed with insecticide use.  To the
extent that willingness to pay though insecticide reduction crowds out voluntary herbicide
reduction, the risk gains per unit of crop protection forgone is lower than for a n overall
risk reduction program that would have a greater impact on herbicide use.  We calculated
a farm level measure of the marginal risk valuation for each producer by multiplying this
value by the number of acres held by each producer.  The average farm level value of risk17
reductions associated with lower herbicide use $78.49 and was $57.77 for decreased
insecticide use.
Neither ENVSCOR nor AGPLSCOR significantly influenced acceptable yield loss.
One explanation is that farmers' subjective risk tradeoff is framed without reference to the
regulatory and environmental conditions in the state.  While farmers may be aware of their
state's situation, they do not determine their payments for environmental protection as if
they are contributing to state level improvements. Existing state regulations and
environmental conditions form a background for producer decisions, but do not make
farmers more or less likely to choose voluntary insecticide or herbicide reduction.
Cameron and Englin (1997) emphasized the importance of examining the
robustness of valuations for environmental goods across alternative model specifications. 
They noted that willingness to pay estimates may differ systematically across respondents
and that respondents who have some degree of experience with the good may provide
more reliable valuations.  We examined the effect of experience on farmers’ acceptable
yield loss by imposing a minimum level of pesticide expenditures on producers under the
assumption that expenditures are correlated with familiarity with the chemical systems .
Higley and Wintersteen (1992) reported a typical range of expenditures per acre
for both insecticides ($7 to $15) and herbicides ($5 to $25) for the sampled states.  We
exclude producers who report pesticide expenditures that fall outside this range from the
model and estimate the predicted acceptable yield loss from the seemingly unrelated
model.  The predicted acceptable yield losses for one less insecticide or herbicide18
application for the full sample and for the more restricted experienced user model are very
close.  The predicted acceptable yield loss for  reduced insecticide use from the full model
is $8.25 and is only slightly higher at  $8.85 value for experienced users.   The predicted
yield loss for the herbicide model reveals the same pattern at $10.52 for the full sample
and $11.07 for experienced users. In the full sample, 14 percent reported zero
expenditures on insecticides and 10 percent recalled zero expenditures on herbicides in
1989.  Crop rotations, participation in set aside programs or conservation reserve, organic
production methods, fallowing or grazing, and other factors could account for these
individuals.  Given the small differences between the full and experienced samples, it is
probable that all these farmers were knowledgeable of chemical methods and were capable
of assessing the risk-yield loss trade off.
Conclusions
We apply an indirect utility model to demonstrate that farmers are willing to
voluntarily reduce insecticide use, accepting yield losses for moderate reduction in
environmental risk.  The results indicate that more experienced, better educated farmers,
those who spend more on pesticides, and those who more highly rate protection of
environmental goods will pay more.  Estimation was based on data from 1,124
Midwestern crop farmers, and is generalizable to other producers who share similar
characteristics.  Our results show that farmers have self-described risk perceptions that
enable them to make assessments of risk-yield loss tradeoffs, even when alternative crop
protection methods are not explicitly offered.  This suggests there are fundamental19
attitudes about the relative importance of farm income and environmental protection that
are embodied in the farmer’s utility function and that moderate insecticide and herbicide
use decisions.
Policy makers who wish to encourage and assist farmers to make voluntary
reductions in chemical use should determine barriers to such actions.  First, uncertainty
about insecticide and herbicide risks exists, whereas the scenario guarantees risk
avoidance by reducing chemical use.  Farmers may not believe the risk to environmental
goods can be avoided by eliminating a single application, or they may believe current risk
levels are low, rather than moderate.  Research to determine economic and environmental
risks and returns from reduction in insecticide use would provide a credible basis for
making choices.
A second barrier is that farmers may feel they place themselves at a competitive
disadvantage if they unilaterally reduce insecticide or herbicide use.  The benefit of risk
avoidance is shared by everyone, but producers who reduce chemical use bear the full
cost.  The questionnaire asked farmers to consider only their willingness to pay, in the
absence of any contribution by other farmers.  If they knew others would reduce chemicals
by an equal amount, farmers might be motivated to pay less.   Arora and Cason (1996)
showed that publicity about and consumer awareness of voluntary compliance tend to
increase participation rates.  They recommended that these features are important design
considerations for promotional programs.   Several voluntary agricultural programs give
highly publicized awards for exceptional performance (Vickery and Lohr, 1997), which20
can encourage competition and raise the average and total willingness to pay for risk
reduction.
Third, the crowding out effect of encouraging environmental risk reduction,
defined by the five factors in INSENV and HRBENV, at the expense of economic risk
reduction, defined by the six factors in INSECN and HRBECN, should be avoided.  With
fewer alternatives to herbicide use available, and more evidence of pervasive
contamination by herbicides, farmers tend to consider both aspects of risk in their
willingness to pay for risk reduction.  With insecticides, primarily environmental factors
are being valued.  Since herbicide risk reduction generates higher willingness to pay than
insecticide risk reduction, any program that focusses on birds, fish, mammalian wildlife,
native plants and endangered species will be less cost-effective than a broader emphasis
encompassing human, insect and livestock health risks.  Most programs to assist in farm
risk reduction address a range of potential risks (Vickery and Lohr, 1997).  Our research
suggests that whole farm planning programs to assist in voluntary risk assessment and
management will be highly successful in making agriculture more economically and
environmentally sustainable in the 21st century.21
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Table 1.  Description of Variables Used for Choice Model 
Variable Description
INSYLOSS Acceptable yield loss to avoid moderate risks from insecticide ($/acre) 
HRBYLOSS Acceptable yield loss to avoid moderate risks from herbicide ($/acre) 
ACRES Number of acres farmed 
FARMYR Number of years in farming 
EDUC Years of formal education
ITOTCOST Total per acre expenditure on insecticides in 1989 ($/acre)
HTOTCOST Total per acre expenditure on herbicides in 1989 ($/acre)
TOTCOST2 Square of TOTCOST (ITOTCOST2, HTOTCOST2)
INSECN Economic importance index for insecticide risk (sum of 6 factors)
HRBECN Economic importance index for herbicide risk (sum of 6 factors)
Importance of protecting surface water, ground water, beneficial insects,
livestock/crops, acute human health effects and chronic human health
effects rated from 1 to 10
INSENV Environmental importance index of insecticide risk (sum of 5 factors) 
HRBENV Environmental importance index of herbicides (sum of  5 factors) 
Importance of protecting fish, birds, mammals, native plants and
endangered species rated from 1 to 10
ENVSCOR Natural log of environmental score by state
 
AGPLSCOR Natural log of agricultural pollution score by state 25
Table 2.  Mean Values and Standard Errors of Independent Variables
Explanatory Variable Mean Value  Standard Error 
ACRES 570.39  546.73 
FARMYR 26.43    13.30 
EDUC 13.15  2.19 
ITOTCOST   3.46   5.86 
ITOTCOST2 46.30 329.22 
HTOTCOST   12.80   10.32 
HTOTCOST2 270.17 1409.40 
INSECN 53.25  8.58 
INSENV 38.98 10.12 
HRBECN 52.50    9.12
HRBENV  38.22   10.64
ENVSCOR 8.83 0.05 
AGPLSCOR 6.00  0.07 




Table 3. Estimates from the Joint Model for Yield Loss-Environmental Risk Tradeoff 
Explanatory Variable Insecticide Tradeoff  Herbicide Tradeoff
ITOTCOST, HTOTCOST  0.079   0.109  
*  *
(2.060) (3.783)
ITOTCOST2, HTOTCOST2 -0.0009 -0.0006
*
(-1.315) (-2.750)
ACRES -0.0006  -0.0003
(-1.405) (-0.675)






















The dependent variable is yield loss (INSYLOSS and HRBYLOSS).  Asymptotic t-statistics are in
parentheses.  Asterisk indicates significance at the 0.10 confidence level.  The critical value for the
likelihood ratio statistic is 28.87 at 0.05 confidence level.Figure 1. Environmental Risk and Farmer’s Expected Utility Locus